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Abstract Contemporary theories of the policy process typically assume that policy
responses tend to go through long periods of stasis alternated with occasional bursts of
intense activity. The concept of policy punctuations has been put forward to denote large-
scale changes in public policies that take place in crisis moments. However, research on the
dynamics of policy overreaction and underreaction is still in its infancy. It has mostly
focused on either small-n cross-sectional analysis of government spending or case studies
of single events. A comparative assessment of the extent of disproportionate responses in a
crisis is still lacking. To fill this gap, in this paper we develop a framework to concep-
tualize, operationalize, and ultimately assess disproportionate policy responses systemat-
ically from a cross-sectional perspective. We create a series of indexes to measure policy
over- and underreactions among the EU member states that experienced the 2007–2008
banking crisis. We found that a large majority of EU countries overreacted through public
liability guarantee and budget commitment. On the other hand, regulatory responses are
characterized by a greater variation.
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Introduction
How can one assess whether a country’s policy response to the 2007–2008 banking crisis
was disproportionate? This question calls also for a clear and broader conceptualization
and measurement of (dis)proportionate policy response: Can we assess disproportionality?
If so, how? This paper argues that a nuanced assessment requires a comparative mea-
surement that also accounts for differences in the units of analysis. Accordingly, we
propose a set of indicators for understanding in a systematic way the relationship between
the severity of crisis and policy reaction among the EU member states that experienced
banking crises.
The literature on disproportionate policy response relies on two main anchor concepts:
policy overreaction and policy underreaction (Maor 2017). Although both concepts express
violations from proportionality (Maor 2017), we are not aware of any attempt to empiri-
cally measure cross-sectionally the mismatch between the severity of a crisis and the
intensity of policy response. By examining a specific policy area, namely financial con-
tainment of banking crisis and banking regulation, we aim to extend the analytical
framework of disproportionate policy response and propose indexes that enable us to assess
the extent of policy under- and overreaction.
To do so, this study has two objectives. Our first aim is to put forward the argument that
the concept of (dis)proportionality of policy responses can be measured, but it requires to
be related to the extent of severity of a crisis a given government faces and to be opera-
tionalized it in a relational way. The second objective is to provide an empirical application
of the proposed indicators. After identifying which European countries have recently
experienced banking crisis, we rely on existing data on systemic banking crises and sur-
veys of bank regulations. This allows us to compare the extent of a given government’s
disproportionate response (changes in the regulation and surveillance of the banking
system, and the fiscal consequences of governments’ bailouts) with the other European
countries that experienced the 2007–2008 banking crisis.
Several cross-country analyses have assessed various types of policy change as a
reaction to the 2007–2008 banking crisis. However, scholars have tended to focus on
variations in microprudential (Zimmermann 2013; Fenger and Quaglia 2016), macropru-
dential regulation (Baker 2013),1 or fiscal policy (Grossman and Woll 2014), without
providing a comprehensive overview of the extent of disproportionality associated with the
different measures governments utilize to respond to the crisis. Furthermore, different
explanatory frameworks have taken different types of policy response as the dependent
variable. For instance, Moschella and Tsingou (2013) relied on a theoretical framework to
capture the interaction between institutional path dependence, on the one hand, and change
agents and veto players, on the other hand, to explain the variation in the dynamics of
change in financial regulation. Young and Park (2013) used a simpler variable, that is, the
dominance of the financial sector in the economic and political landscape, to explain the
variation in regulatory response, with the latter measured through an aggregate index.
Focusing on bank bailouts, Grossman and Woll (2014) combined economic–financial
explanations with the institutional context of business–government relations.
We contribute to this comparative policy analysis literature by making conceptual and
methodological suggestions for the study of policy responses. The theory of dispropor-
tionate policy response provides a useful framework for comparing the extent of variation
1 There is agreement in the literature that one can observe a shift from more importance being attached to
microprudential regulation to more importance being attached to macroprudential regulation (Baker).
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of both (micro- and macroprudential) regulatory and fiscal changes. We analyze the extent
of governments’ policy response as the distance from a supposedly proportional level of
public intervention. We conceive underreaction and overreaction as a result of an adjusted
ratio to the (domestic) severity of the banking crisis. Accordingly, the extent of any
disproportionality is determined as the distance of a given country’s set of policy responses
to the average response of a sample of countries, in our case the member states of the
European Union, while accounting for domestic-level variation in the severity of the crisis.
Our case selection strategy allows us to focus on policy responses of governments within
the same international regulatory environment, so as to endogenize the interplay between
the impact of the banking crisis and compliance with international banking agreements.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
literature on the proportionality of policy responses, while third section links this literature
to the banking crisis. ‘‘Methodological steps for constructing an index of disproportionate
policy response to banking crisis’’ section describes the methodology for the construction
of indexes that can measure the proportionality of a policy response, specifically in the
context of the banking crisis. ‘‘An application of the indexes’’ section provides descriptive
findings on the application of the proposed indicators. In the ‘‘Conclusion’’ section con-
cludes we propose future research avenues for comparative scholars of public policy.
Disproportionate policy responses
Governments, even more than human beings, do not generally respond proportionally to
the signals they receive from their environment. Instead, they typically alternate between
periods of underestimation of existing problems and periods when they overrespond to
external stimuli (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Following Jones and Baumgartner, this
disproportionality depends on two main factors. First, decision costs associated with
institutional constraints and with the presence of veto players limit the internal organi-
zational capacity for quick consequential action. Second, because ‘limited attention is a
key facet of human cognitive capacity, and is reflected in organizations’ (Jones 2017,
p. 66), it is cognitively impossible for policy makers and government to allocate an optimal
level of attention to all problems all the time. Therefore, most policy issues tend to remain
outside the center of attention of governments—typically configuring a situation of limited
policy change or underreaction—but they may become suddenly salient at some point, e.g.,
following an external shock or crisis—potentially triggering a large policy change or
overreaction.
By challenging incrementalism, the disproportionality of policy responses is the
observed pattern that contemporary theories of the policy process, in particular of the
punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner et al. 2014), attempt to identify and explain
(Jones 2017). Accordingly, policy making is characterized by long periods of stasis and
incremental change alternating with occasional bursts of intense activity that produce
large-scale departures. Through distributional methodology and time-series analysis of
policy changes, this type of punctuated equilibrium (characterized by a great predominance
of cases in the central peak of the distribution of the extent of policy changes and by ‘weak
shoulders’ and ‘very wide tails’) was empirically observed first in the budgetary policies of
the US federal government and then in many other public policies and political systems,
mainly by scholars associated with the policy agenda project.
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Whereas this general pattern of disproportional responses seems corroborated by
empirical evidence especially in the study of budgets (Jones et al. 2009), the causes of
specific episodes of under- or overreaction—the policy change events falling within the
‘very wide tails’ of the distribution—remain to be determined. The analysis of such
specific episodes has required conceptual, theoretical, and methodological (yet to be
completed) advancements.
At the conceptual level, Maor (2014a, p. 426) defined policy underreaction as ‘sys-
tematically slow and/or insufficient response by policymakers to increased risk or
opportunity, or no response at all.’ This concept can be associated with the similar concept
of policy underinvestiment that ‘occurs when policymakers underinvest in a single policy
instrument below its instrumental value in achieving a policy goal’ (Maor 2017, p. 7). A
negative policy bubble occurs if policy underinvestment is sustained over a long period
time (Maor 2016). Analogously, policy overreactions ‘are policies that impose objective
and/or perceived social costs without producing offsetting objective and/or perceived
benefits’ (Maor 2012, p. 235). Again, this concept can be associated with the concept of
overinvestment that ‘occurs when government overinvests in a single policy instrument
beyond its instrumental value in achieving a policy goal’ (Jones et al. 2014, p. 149). Policy
bubbles occur if policy overinvestment is sustained over a long period time (Maor 2014b).
Notwithstanding their definitional similarities, there are two important elements for
distinguishing the concepts of policy under–overreaction and policy under–overinvest-
ment. First, policy under–overinvestment related to a single policy instrument as evidenced
by the case studies of crime detection and punishment, charter schools and private edu-
cation vouchers, and private contracting, whereas policy under–overreaction is generally
associated with episodic ‘big’ decisions taken by government (Maor 2012, 2014a). Second,
whereas economic efficiency underlies under–overinvestment in a policy tool, policy
under–overreaction is based on public interest that includes other social goals beyond
economic efficiency such as social justice and environmental sustainability (Maor 2017,
p. 7).
The distinction between the two concepts is also present at the theoretical level.
Although both strands rely on ‘behavioral rationality,’ policy under–overinvestments are
based on positive feedback processes (in which a policy change leads to demands for even
more changes usually associated with an externally generated problem, shift of attention,
and high level of media coverage) and contagion through mimicking and cognitive cue-
taking and shortcuts (Jones et al. 2014). On the other hand, the literature of policy under–
overreaction relies on behavioral theories not exclusively related to the (organizational and
individual) ability to process information in efficient way2 in order to ‘respond in pro-
portion to the strength of information indicating the severity of problems in the in the
policymaking environment’ (Jones et al. 2014, p. 147). Maor (2014a) argued that under-
reaction could be specified in terms of both whether or not policy makers had detected and
accurately estimated risks unfolding over time in a way that match their severity and
whether their action had been constrained by organizational (i.e., norms and routines) and/
or external (i.e., veto players) sources of path dependence. Similarly, overreaction may
come in different modes, which mostly depends on whether policy makers accurately
estimate information about positive or negative events (Maor 2012). Overreaction might
arise from policy makers’ overconfidence in their abilities and in the accuracy of their
2 Because of complexity of the issue, the lack of institutional capacity (Epp and Baumgartner 2017), as well
as inefficiency in allocating attention and institutional resistance, policy change is considered inefficient in
matching the intensity of a policy action and the intensity of a policy problem (Jones et al. 2014).
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information. In the literature of psychology of judgment, overconfidence is due to decision
makers’ inability to assess their own competence and to the psychological benefit arising
from this condition.
At the methodological level, the two literature strands are also different. Sustained
policy under–overinvestments have been assessed by plotting the longitudinal correspon-
dence between the intensity of policy instrument (for instance, the total number of
American incarcerated), the intensity of a policy problem (for instance, rate of crime), and
media attention (for instance, the number of New York Times front pages on crime) (Jones
et al. 2014). Such correspondence is a demonstration of proportionality. This approach was
used in assessing the policy of housing shortage in Hong Honk (Or 2015), while the lack of
statistical correlation between changes in industry-specific labor and economic measures
and US states’ tax incentives for motion picture industry attested the existence of a policy
bubble (Thom 2016).
The literature of policy under–overreaction revolves around conceptual typologies
underlying different behavioral mechanisms and processes (Maor 2012, 2014a, b) and
general conditions, expectations and hypotheses of disproportionality (Maor et al. 2017;
Peters et al. 2017). These conceptual and theoretical advances inspired a number of
qualitative empirical studies (Behn et al. 2015; Meyer 2016; Howlett and Kemmerling
2017; Gillard and Lock 2017). For instance, Meyer (2016) studied underreaction in foreign
policy with respect to transboundary security threats. A key finding was the need for more
reflexivity on lessons learned from prior experiences, regarding both policy success and
policy failure. Careful contextualization is required to establish the degree of similarity
with the cases under investigation and to derive applicable lessons. Behn et al. (2015)
examined the emergence of international law protecting investment rights. This phe-
nomenon was characterized as a policy bubble triggered by an overestimation of the
benefits of protection of foreign direct investment.
We can identify two major gaps in the literature. The first is in the operationalization of
disproportionate policy responses. While existing studies—as those mentioned above—put
forward rich and nuanced ways to measure policy (dis)proportionality, there is a need for a
more systematic measurement strategy that is more parsimonious, intersubjective, and is
suitable for large-n comparative research. Indeed, existing studies are based on single cases
or on small-n studies and frequently use the secondary literature as the main source of
empirical evidence. The second gap concerns the political determinants of the accuracy of
risk estimation by policy makers. In the literature, the microfoundations of dispropor-
tionate policy responses are essentially rooted in psychological and behavioral determi-
nants, such as cognitive biases and emotions. While we recognize the added value of these
perspectives, we argue that the role of political factors has been underestimated. In the
specific case of banking crisis, we expect that inaccurate risk estimation—and thereby the
extent and type of policy under- or overreaction—can be shaped by government coalitions
and ideology, by the extent of financialization, and by the relevance of financial interest
group within the relationship with governments and banks and can even be a conscious
political strategy. For instance, Zimmermann (2013) explained that the variety of deposit
insurance is strongly related to characteristics of domestic financial markets as well as the
dominant role of concentrated financial interest groups. Accordingly, the international
harmonization of regulatory governance would be unlikely. Fenger and Quaglia
(2016) identified ‘market-making’ and ‘market-shaping’ coalitions in order to compare
regulatory changes and deposit insurance schemes in the EU, the Netherlands, and the UK.
Their empirical findings show limited reform of the status quo, since ‘central banks and
supervisory authorities were members of one of the coalitions, rather than being objective
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providers of analytical knowledge about the governance of the financial sectors’ (Fenger
and Quaglia 2016, p. 514). By revolving around the information asymmetry that occurs
between elected decision maker and financial oversight institutions, Gandrud and O’Keeffe
(2017) explained the dynamic of the Irish government’s financial overcommitment to
banking crisis.
In this paper, we tackle the first issue—the absence of a simple measure of policy
disproportionate responses to banking crisis. This will also enable future researchers to
address the second issue—the political determinants of disproportionate policy responses.
Banking crises and policy responses
Because banks are highly interdependent institutions that are exposed to systemic risks,
banking crises are very complex phenomena, usually associated with (more generalized)
financial crises. These crises are characterized by a situation where many financial insti-
tutions experience solvency and liquidity problems, a large number of defaults occurs, the
banking system’s capital becomes exhausted, the value of assets drops, capital flows to
enterprises and households are slowed, and capital outflows rise dramatically (Laeven and
Valencia 2013). These failures and the consequent reduction in the extent and efficiency of
credit allocation can result in large economic losses for a country or region usually
manifested in depressed aggregate demand and domestic growth (Laeven 2011). Fur-
thermore, banking crises have distributional consequences, as they affect debtors and
savers facing insolvency problems, as well as taxpayers when bailouts, containment policy,
and other policy measures imply wealth transfers from the public sector to banks and other
financial institutions.
For these reasons, banking crises represent a key and complex public policy problem
and typically trigger a policy response, often in the form of a large-scale policy inter-
vention. Public regulation of the banking sector essentially aims to minimize both the risk
and the negative consequences of banking crises, to maintain the stability of the system,
and to influence the credit allocation process (Busch 2009). Busch (2009, chapter 2) sta-
ted that policy makers use several methods to attain these goals, including partial or full
nationalization of banks; direct interventions in the credit allocation mechanisms; capital
movement controls; rules limiting banks’ activities; the separation of commercial and
investment banks; restrictions on competition; and deposit insurance schemes. Several of
these policy measures are associated with public liability guarantees and public budget
commitment.
Historically, public intervention has been mostly confined to reactive measures and
quite limited with respect to other sectors that were either state-owned (such as utilities) or
more strictly regulated (such as for pharmaceuticals) (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).
Banks operate in a long-standing globalized market, in which regulation is traditionally
light touch and weakly internationalized, and intergovernmental initiatives have been
rather limited, especially since the deregulation of banking markets from the 1980s
(O’Connor 2005). Internationally coordinated regulation is increasing but remained much
more limited than in other policy areas, at least until the 2008 financial crisis (Underhill
and Zhang 2008). This may explain a general tendency toward underreaction until the
emergence of international financial crisis that leads governments to introduce regulatory
reform, which can be highly controversial.
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Some authors call into question too much intervention, while others criticize the
opposite, that is, insufficient regulation of the banking sector. Both positions, however,
agree that a non-optimal and a non-proportional level of regulation to the severity of crisis
can be disruptive. Indeed, some argue that regulatory restrictions may distort the devel-
opment and effectiveness of the banking sector, e.g., those regarding the ability of banks to
own nonfinancial firms and engage in securities markets (Barth et al. 2008). It has also
been observed that a state guarantee on deposits may lead to moral hazard and banks taking
on excessive risks, creating in turn systemic vulnerabilities (Ranciere and Tornell 2011).
On the other hand, other scholars tend to put emphasis on a set of regulatory tools as
crucial factors to prevent or halt a banking crisis (Griffith-Jones et al. 2010). Prudential
regulation and capital requirements determining the capital/asset ratio ensure that banks do
not exceed their leverage and become insolvent. Another key regulation concerns trans-
parency obligations and the disclosure of accurate information to facilitate market actors’
scrutiny and regulatory oversight. Finally, the power of national regulatory authorities to
supervise banks can be related to their capacity to detect wrongdoings and systemic risks.
Studies have shown that capital market liberalization produces instability, especially when
it happens quickly and without the appropriate accompanying regulatory framework
(Stiglitz 2000).
How can one get a sense of the effectiveness of policy responses to banking crises?
Economic models have been used to identify the optimal level of regulatory and fiscal
oversight of the banking and finance sector. For instance, Ennis and Keister (2010)
modeled depositors’ decisions and policy choices in order to find the optimal equilibrium
in cases where the government gives either a full or a limited commitment to freeze
deposits. Similarly, Cooper and Ross (2002) investigated the optimal equilibrium between
risk sharing and moral hazard associated with deposit insurance.
An alternative way to assess government responses to banking crisis is to rely on an
equilibrium that takes into account the relationship between the crisis severity and the
magnitude of police change in terms of public budget commitment and regulatory reform.
This equilibrium is at the core of the concept of proportionality as developed by the policy
analysis literature. With regard to the public budget commitment, government aims to
restore confidence to the financial system without exposing to significant fiscal costs.
Accordingly, Gandrud and O’Keeffe (2017, p. 392) assumed that a decision maker has a
‘moderate’ preference for a level of public liability guarantees that will not have ‘no direct
costs to the taxpayer.’ Accordingly, an elected decision maker would aim for a (propor-
tional) level of public budget commitment (for guaranteeing the value of banking system
assets) that equals the recovery value of those assets (Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017, p. 392).
(Dis)proportionality is also a concept developed for banking regulation. It has been
associated with ‘excessive regulation [that] make the burden (costs at the margin) of
regulatory compliance exceed the benefits’ (Goodhart et al. 1998, p. 61).3 However,
measuring regulatory costs and especially regulatory benefits of a regulatory reform is very
complex, if not almost impossible (Goodhart et al. 1998, p. 66). This leaves us with the
relationship between severity of crisis and the extent of policy response that we will
explore in the next section.
3 Proportionality is also a principle by the European Banking Authority (2015, p. 14) that refers to the
disproportionate allocation of regulatory costs to small banks: ‘The principle of proportionality means that
small and non-complex institutions can comply with the principles by implementing less complex, but still
appropriate, […] policies, while large and complex institutions have to implement more sophisticated […]
policies.’
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Methodological steps for constructing an index of disproportionate policy
response to banking crisis
There is an emerging but still scarce literature on how to conceptualize and construct
indicators of policy dynamics and changes conceived as a dependent variable for com-
parative policy analysis. Change denotes an empirical observation of difference in the
form, quality, or state of a policy. This broad definition encompasses concepts of policy
innovation and reform and different orders of change. Taxonomies have been proposed for
defining changes in policy components, as well as in the tempo or speed of change
(Howlett and Cashore 2009). In addition, measures of density and intensity associated with
policy instruments have been put forward (Schaffrin et al. 2015). The former equals the
sum of the number of policy instruments in a specific domain; the latter is about their
specific content (Knill et al. 2012) and is associated with the importance or significance of
the particular policy intervention.4
Since the discussion on ‘indexes’ of policy change is, however, centered on components
and instruments, datasets are created specifically for each specific policy area. Several
measures have been designed to capture the extent of change of bank regulation across
countries. Young and Park (2013) relied on legal consultants’ surveys of banking regu-
latory change in order to devise a simple additive scoring system which accounts for
regulatory reform, in consumer protection, regulatory powers or supervisory consolidation,
bank capital requirements, bank liquidity requirements, banking corporate governance, and
the early implementation of post-crisis international standards. The scores were ultimately
associated with a qualitative taxonomy of banking regulatory reform ‘ranging from the
complete absence of regulatory reform to radical, path-breaking reform’ (Young and Park
2013, p. 565)
Based on the work of Barth et al. (2013), the World Bank collects systematically data in
order to measure the extent of bank regulation and financial supervisory policies. This data
collection relies on surveys. Bank regulatory officials had been asked hundreds of ques-
tions on different dimensions of banking governance, such as permissible bank activities,
capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure
requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and
loan provisioning. By providing systematic measures of bank regulation and supervision,
the World Bank’s Bank Regulation Dataset is very helpful for any research on the design
and implementation of regulatory governance of banking systems.5 Systematic collection
of data has been also pursued by Laeven and Valencia (2013) in order to account for
systemic banking crises. Their dataset aims to specify the occurrence of ‘systemic banking
crises’ during 1970–2011. The dataset also provides measures of macroeconomic policy
responses to the systemic banking crisis.
The combination of these two datasets, as well as Grossman and Woll’s (2014) dataset
on financial responses of EU member states, provides extremely useful data for the
assessment of the extent of policy reactions to systemic banking crisis. This assessment can
be conducted in a comparative perspective. The remainder of this section describes the
methodological steps for constructing indexes of policy responses to systemic bank crisis.
4 There is also a literature on the methodological issues, such as weighting and double counting of sub-
indexes and concerning the construction of aggregated measures of policy (OECD and European Union
Joint Research Centre 2008).
5 The first wave of surveys was completed in 1999; the second wave contained information relating to year
2002; the third wave to 2006; the fourth survey to 2011.
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Identifying systemic banking crises within the European Union
The first methodological step is to identify when a banking crisis occurred in a given
country. Economists working at the International Monetary Fund were able to identify such
occurrences (even though, as mentioned above, such identification is not uncontroversial).
Laeven and Valencia (2013) distinguished between (‘localized’) banking crisis and sys-
temic banking crisis. Furthermore, they specified when a systemic banking crisis led to a
sovereign banking debt crisis. A banking crisis occurred in several countries during the
2008–2009 financial market turmoil. Among the European Union member states, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Spain, and the UK experienced a systemic banking crisis, whereas France, Hungary, Italy,
Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden experienced only a banking crisis. Our focus on EU
member states is justified by the fact that we want to identify cases where unilateral
decisions were made in a highly coordinated policy domain such as the banking sector in
the European single market, while endogenizing the role of international banking regimes.6
Qualifying and associating proportionate policy response to measures
of severity of banking crisis
We rely on the following concept of proportionate policy response: ‘Whereas propor-
tionality is easily understood as a standard that requires perfect balance between policy
costs and benefits as well as between policy ends and means, disproportionate policy
response violates this standard’ (Maor 2017, p. 3). This definition allows us to conceptually
bring together both under- and overreaction. Overreaction occurs when policy costs exceed
policy benefits and underreaction when policy means are insufficient to achieve policy
ends.
As it is impossible to quantify policy costs and benefits as well as the relation between
means and ends, proportionality is operationalized here as a balanced relationship between
severity of crisis and the extent of policy change. We rely on this relationship in order to
assess the extent to which government is capable of acquiring and using accurate infor-
mation (Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017) to calibrate policy responses proportionally to the
specific crisis event.
Designing indexes of macroeconomic policy response
In this paper, the policy response to the 2007–2008 financial crisis is separately analyzed as
the macroeconomic response and the regulatory response. In this regard, it is important to
note that we present different indicators of the crisis (c1, c2, etc.), and, respectively, of
policy responses (r1, r2, etc.), to construct our indexes of disproportionality. These indi-
cators (i1, i2, etc.) are to be understood as alternative measures to be selected with ref-
erence to specific research goals. They can also be operationalized as components of a
high-level aggregate measure, even if we restrain to do so in this article.
Grossman and Woll (2014, p. 579) stated that ‘there seems to be no clear relationship
between the cumulated losses in the banking and real estate sector and the amounts
governments committed to save their banks by July 2009, although governments tend to
6 The other countries that experienced a banking crisis during the 2007–2009 period were: Iceland (sys-
temic crisis), Kazakhstan (systemic crisis), Mongolia (systemic crisis), Nigeria (systemic crisis), Russia
(systemic crisis), Switzerland, Ukraine (systemic crisis), and the USA (systemic crisis).
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intervene when their sector is hit.’ The differences between cumulative losses in the
banking sector versus committed bailout expenditures clearly attest to an intense policy
response in Ireland and Denmark. Another measure is the difference between the actual
fiscal expenditures and the net cost of bailout, since the money budgeted for bailing out
banks was not always used (Grossman and Woll 2014, p. 581). Six of the 18 EU member
states considered in Grossman and Woll’s analysis did not experience a systemic banking
crisis (as defined by Laeven and Valencia) during 2007–2008: France, Hungary, Italy,
Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden. A systemic banking crisis did occur in other 11 EU
member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. And there was a great variation in the policy
response to the banking crisis among the latter group of countries. With the exception of
Finland, which was not considered in Laeven and Valencia’s dataset on the banking crisis,
the two datasets are consistent in defining which EU member states experienced a banking
crisis during the 2007–2008 period.
This consistency allows us to utilize for our analysis the following macroeconomic
variables for measuring the severity of the banking crisis and the extent of a government’s
response.
We rely on Laeven and Valencia (2013) and Grossman and Woll (2014) for the fol-
lowing measures of the extent of severity of the banking crisis (c):
c1: Peak of nonperforming loans as a % of total loans (Laeven and Valencia 2013)
c2: Cumulative losses in the banking sector as % of GDP (Grossman and Woll 2014)
c3: Net cost of bailouts as % of GDP (Grossman and Woll 2014).
and the following measures of the extent of policy response to the banking crisis (r):
r1: Peak support in % of deposits (Laeven and Valencia 2013)
r2: Committed bailout expenditures as % of GDP (Grossman and Woll 2014)
r3: Actual expenditures as % of GDP (Grossman and Woll 2014).
These two types of measures can be aggregated for every alternative indicator of c and r
in an index following this general form (Eq. 1):
i ¼
r  c
mean of rð Þ  mean of cð Þ
ð1Þ
where r indicates the intensity of the reaction and c indicates the severity of the crisis.
Similarly to Gandrud and O’Keeffe (2017), we assume that a (banking) policy decision
maker aims to minimize the taxpayers losses while trying to achieve the intended policy
ends, and accordingly, r-c = 0 and i = 0 would indicate proportionality; i[ 0 would
indicate overreaction; and i\ 0 would indicate underreaction.
This equation follows the method of ‘distance to a reference country’ which in this case
is the average country of the sample. ‘Distance to a reference measures the relative position
of a given indicator [the numerator] vis-a`-vis a reference point [the denominator]’ (OECD
and JRC 2008, p. 28). The reference point could be a target, a benchmark country, or as in
this case the average values within the sample of countries. This method allows us to
emphasize values of extreme under- or overreaction from the difference between the
average of policy responses and the average of the severity of the crisis (OECD and JRC
2008, pp. 28–30). This methodological choice is justified by the high uncertainty faced by
decision makers in responding to banking crisis. Accordingly, in order to relax our
assumption of the extent of the quality of information concerning the severity of the crisis,
our indicator does not simply measure the mismatch of a given country between r and c,
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but it is a proportion of this mismatch to the reference point, the denominator of Eq. 1.
Accordingly, we put forward the claim that in condition of high uncertainty, typical of
severe crisis, this denominator facilitates the conceptualization and operationalization of
what is the standard of policy proportionality.
From Eq. 1, we can attribute the above measures of response and severity of crisis in
order to derive to the possible measures of (dis)proportionate policy response at the
macroeconomic level.
In Eq. 2, i1 measures the extent of mismatch between the peak support of deposits and
the peak of nonperforming loans. This index indicates the extent of overreaction in sup-
porting banking customers’ deposits. The link between the peak support of deposits and the
peak of nonperforming loans with respect to banking crisis can be understood by referring
to the Japanese government’s banking policy reaction to the 1990s banking crisis. ‘After
Japanese banks started to suffer from the nonperforming loans crisis in the 1990s, the
Deposit Insurance Act was revised in 1996 to temporarily lift the deposit insurance cov-
erage limit of Yen 10 million (about USD 95,000) per person per bank, so as to insure all
deposit without limit’ (Schich 2009, p. 95). More generally, as the recent Irish financial
crisis shows, governments have responded by increasing the deposit guarantee
scheme limit (Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017). Furthermore, Zimmermann (2013) argues
that, given, deposit insurance has become ‘a core element of social protection’ against the
excess of financialization and financial globalization. It is important to note that deposit
insurance gives rise to moral hazard. Accordingly, excessive deposit insurance leads to an
increase in nonperforming loans, because of the ‘less monitoring by depositors, which
allows banks to hold riskier portfolios’ (Cooper and Ross 2002, p. 57). And this may
generally result in nonperforming loans.
i1 ¼
r1 c1
mean of r1ð Þ  mean of c1ð Þ
ð2Þ
In Eq. 3, i2 measures the mismatch between the extent of the government’s budgetary
commitment in banking bailout and the aggregate loss of a given country’s banking sys-
tem. This relationship has been the core of the investigation of several studies (Grossman
and Woll 2014; Schneider 2014; Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017). Budgetary commitment is a
gross measure of the level of containment policy decided by a government in the wake of a
crisis in order to restore confidence in financial systems.7 Although commitment is not a
measure of actual spending of the public budget, the choices of this containment level are
not ‘trivial’ (Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017, p. 394). Because it cannot be adjusted without
undermining market confidence, a higher level of budgetary commitment may pose large
and long-lasting effects on public finance (Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017), also by enhancing
banks’ moral hazard and undermining their incentive to be prudent during the same crisis
(Weber and Schmitz 2011). Accordingly, that this index assesses the extent of a given
government’s informative capacity in assessing the severity of a financial crisis and
responding proportionally to it.
i2 ¼
r2 c2
mean of r2ð Þ  mean of c2ð Þ
ð3Þ
7 Containment to financial crisis usually includes guarantee and asset guarantees, liquidity assistance, and
recapitalization that ensure the liquidity of banks (Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017, p. 392).
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In Eq. 4, i3 measures the mismatch between the government’s actual financial expen-
diture on bailing out banks in July 2009 and the net cost of bailouts as estimated at the end
of 2010 (Grossman and Woll 2014).8 Both measures are expressed as a percentage of the
GDP. This difference assesses the informative capacity of governments to design ‘a
costless containment’ (Gandrud and O’Keeffe 2017) to banking crisis by predicting the
bank assets’ recovery values and by imposing lending requirements to banks benefitting
from rescue packages that minimize the losses for the taxpayers, i.e., one of the objectives
of the 2008 EU bank packages (Posch et al. 2009).
i3 ¼
r3 c3
mean of r3ð Þ  mean of c3ð Þ
ð4Þ
Finally, in Eq. 5, i4 measures the mismatch between the committed financial expen-
diture and the actual expenditure. Again, we believe this ratio shed a light on the infor-
mative capacity of a given government to response to a banking crisis.
i4 ¼
r2 r3
mean of r2ð Þ  mean of r3ð Þ
ð5Þ
Designing indexes of banking regulation response
Government responses to the banking crisis concerned also regulation and supervision of
banks. Relying on the World Bank surveys, it is possible to have an assessment of the types
and the extent of responses at the level of regulatory policy instruments.
The World Bank surveys on banking regulation and supervision cover hundreds of
items. As a consequence, scholars have taken chosen to focus on those aspects of the extent
of banking regulation and supervision that are the most pertinent in a given context (Hoque
et al. 2015). This will be also our approach.
The following are the specific policy measures that we use to assess the extent of
regulatory policy reaction to the banking crisis (Barth et al. 2013):
r4: Capital requirements
r5: Liquidity and risk diversification
r6: Supervision system.
More specifically: r4 corresponds to ‘capital requirements: capital regulatory index,’ an
aggregate measure of the stringency of capital requirements (index identified by the fol-
lowing Roman number: IV.III in Barth et al. 2013); r5 corresponds to ‘liquidity and risk
diversification’ (diversification index, question 7.1 and question 7.2 in Barth et al. 2013);
and r6 corresponds to ‘supervision system and supervisory agency’ (aggregate measures of
supervision power and prompt corrective power from Barth et al. 2013). Other indicators
8 Such a difference ‘depends in great part on the value of the assets governments held, which varied
according to a lot of different factors, both internal to the banks’ investment decisions, the evolution of
financial markets and the design of the bailout (i.e., reimbursement conditions and costs of bailout partic-
ipation). It is nonetheless instructive to see that bailouts cannot always be equated to throwing public money
into the throats of greedy private institutions. The ways in which bailouts are designed and the costs they
impose on the financial industry thus need to be taken into account for a comprehensive discussion’
(Grossman and Woll 2014, p. 582).
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exist,9 but those mentioned above are the most appropriate for operationalizing policy
responses in the context of the present article, as they correspond to policy measures that:
were actually decided by government; can be measured before and after the crisis; and can
be easily distinguished from factors that caused the crisis, or that are part of the crisis.
Measures of c, again the severity of the banking crises, are the same as in the previous
section. For simplicity, in the remainder of this paper we use as a measure of the severity of
the crisis only the peak of nonperforming loans as a % of total loans (c1). However, as
mentioned before, many other instances of c can be considered.
Therefore, the (non-)proportionality of regulatory policy response to the crisis can be
assessed with the following formula (Eq. 6):
i pð Þ ¼
ar  c
mean of arð Þ  mean of cð Þ
ð6Þ
where ar is the percentage change in r, the regulatory change from before to after the crisis,
that is, between 2006 and 2011 (Eq. 7):
ar ¼
r after the crisisð Þ  r before the crisisð Þ
r before the crisisð Þ
 100 ð7Þ
As for above, r indicates the intensity of the reaction and c indicates the severity of the
crisis. i = 0 would indicate a ‘normal reaction’; i[ 0 would indicate overreaction; and
i\ 0 would indicate underreaction. As such, the scales of the indexes are not entirely
comparable, as they depend on the specific values of indicators (this point will be dealt at
the end of this section).
i5 measures the extent of (non-)proportionality as regards the adjustment of capital
requirements with respect to the peak of nonperforming loans (Eq. 8):
i5 ¼
ar4 c1
mean of ar4ð Þ  mean of c1ð Þ
ð8Þ
i6 measures the extent of (non-)proportionality as regards the variation of liquidity and
risk diversification requirements with respect to the peak of nonperforming loans (Eq. 9):
i6 ¼
ar5 c1
mean of ar5ð Þ  mean of c1ð Þ
ð9Þ
Finally, i7 measures the extent of (non-)proportionality as regards changes to the
supervision system with respect to the peak of nonperforming loans (Eq. 10):
i7 ¼
ar6 c1
mean of ar6ð Þ  mean of c1ð Þ
ð10Þ
To ensure comparability across indexes, z-scores can be computed, as follows, so as to
provide standardized values (Eq. 11):
9 Such as ‘regulation of activities: overall restrictions’ (II.IV); ‘regulation of bank governance: whether
changes in the bank governance were a consequence of the financial crisis’ (question 6.8 in the 4th survey);
‘saving protection scheme: changes to your deposit protection system as a result of the global financial
crisis’ (question 8.19 in the 4th survey); ‘banking resolution framework: introduced significant changes to
the banking resolution framework in your country as a result of the global financial crisis’ (question 11.12 in
the 4th survey) (Barth et al. 2013).
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i standardizedð Þ ¼
i mean of ið Þ
standard deviation of ið Þ
ð11Þ
An application of the indexes
We turn now to practical applications of the suggested indexes in the 17 EU member states
that experienced a banking crisis in 2007–2008 according to Laeven and Valencia (2013).
After a brief presentation of the main results of the indexes and their descriptive statistics,
the aim of this section is to illustrate the added value of our indexes in comparison with
other comparative studies of regulatory reform of the banking sector (e.g., Lo 2009;
Grossman and Woll 2014).
Results and summary statistics
Looking at the data stemming from Eqs. 2, 3, 4, and 5, we can have a nuanced assessment
of the extent of the macroeconomic policy response of each country in the sample. To
recall, those four indexes assess the mismatch between the extent of policy reaction r,
measured by several measures of macroeconomic reactions (peak support in % of deposits,
committed bailout expenditures as % of GDP, and actual expenditures as % of GDP) and
the severity of the banking crisis, c, measured by the peak of nonperforming loans, the
cumulative losses in the banking sector, and the net cost of bailout. The data presented in
Table 1 refer to the period when the banking crisis occurred, so that we examine the
prompt response of a given country. Because of data availability, the samples of EU
countries vary between 15 and 17.
Table 1 Indexes of dispropor-
tionate macroeconomic responses
Empty cells indicate missing data
Country i1 i2 i3 i4
AUT 1.316 0.597 0.353 0.802
BEL 2.186 1.762 1.155 2.173
DEN 2.012 4.949 0.009 8.617
FRA 0.6445 0.321 0.246 0.416
GER 0.945 0.427 0.362 0.509
GRE 4.051 0.1075 0.207 0.226
HUN - 1.209 0.132 0.116 0.146
IRL 0.919 4.342 8.924 0.080
ITA - 0.002
LTV - 1.414 0.626 0.284 0.965
LUX 1.773 0.315 0.450 0.306
NDL 0.751 0.916 1.069 0.885
PRT 1.3795 0.234 0.086 0.306
SLO 1.152 0.571
SPA 0.285 0.173 0.220 0.236
SWE 1.4235 0.855 0.388 1.3745
UK 0.647 0.678 1.112 0.492
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The following Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for macroeconomic policy
response in the EU countries. The means of the four indexes are close to 1, indicating a
general tendency of the EU countries facing the 2007–2008 banking crisis to overreact.
There is a relatively large variation of these overreactions, especially in the response
captured by the indexes i3 and i4 that tend to have minimum values close to 0 but high
values (8.9 and 8.6, respectively) associated with the maximum values.
Turning to the regulatory response indexes, Table 3 presents the data of regulatory
changes resulting from the banking crises. Again for data availability, the samples of EU
countries vary between 10 and 15.
The descriptive statistics (cf. Table 4) show that, as the minimum and maximum values
illustrate, there is a balanced representation of countries that under and overreacted through
regulatory responses to the 2007–2008 banking crisis.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of
indexes of disproportionate
macroeconomic responses
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N
i1 1.054 1.272 - 1.414 4.051 16
i2 1 1.437 - 0.002 4.949 17
i3 0.999 2.224 0.009 8.923 15
i4 1.169 2.133 0.08 8.617 15
Table 3 Indexes of dispropor-
tionate banking regulatory (and
surveillance) responses
Empty cells indicate missing data
Country i5 i6 i7
AUT - 0.331479708 0.193305375
BEL 1.838629231 - 0.336386538 - 0.708559299
DEN - 1.236088802 0.186010484
FRA - 0.352333734 - 0.712657046
GER - 0.054841101 1.40571323 - 0.411014804
GRE - 0.721483366 1.212944922 1.941062194
HUN - 1.093671334 1.236778095 - 0.664564802
IRL 1.717448874 - 0.507950332 1.0485638
LTV 0.235846756 - 0.561049238 - 0.31598609
LUX - 0.201962153 - 0.304667389 2.001402651
NDL 0.187118802 - 0.337963733
PRT - 0.964390282 - 1.286734294 - 0.72760707
SLO - 1.370150398 - 0.658981058
SPA 1.368912007 - 1.170974335
UK - 0.942695428 1.400455912
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of
indexes of regulatory responses
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N
i5 0 1.054 - 1.094 1.839 10
i6 0 1.035 - 1.37 1.406 15
i7 0 1.041 - 1.171 2.001 13
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Discussing the macroeconomic policy responses indexes
An analysis of the four macroeconomic indexes (Table 1) indicates that only Hungary and
Latvia underreacted as measured by i1, which takes into account the relationship between
the peak nonperforming loans and the peak of support of deposits. Similarly, there are only
few values that are close to zero, indicating a response that is in line with the average
responses of the sample of countries. Italy attested a value close to zero in the ratio
between committed bailout expenditures and the cumulated losses of the banking sector
(i2), and Denmark and Portugal were able to calibrate an appropriate response to the net
cost of bailout through the actual budgetary expenditures (i3). Finally, Ireland actually
spent almost all the committed bailout expenditure as measured by index i4. And this is an
interesting finding, since Ireland is a country that has greatly overreacted to the banking
crisis, committing bailout expenditure regardless of the extent of cumulative losses of the
banking sector (i2) and the extent of actual expenditure regardless of the net cost of
bailouts (i3). Another interesting case is Denmark, which tended to overreact in supporting
banking deposits (i1) and committing bailout expenditures (i2 and i4). Other countries that
had the tendency to overreact to the banking crisis were Greece (but only on the i2 index)
and Belgium, which that tended to overreaction across all four indexes. Overall, the
macroeconomic indexes attest to widespread policy overreaction, which led to stress or
even crisis in public finances. Is it the same with the regulatory response?
Discussing the indexes of banking regulation responses
In the regulatory indexes, c is again the peak of nonperforming loans as a % of total loans
(c1), while the instances of r refer to the aggregate measure of capital requirements (r4), to
the liquidity and risk diversification (r5), and to the supervision power of banking
authorities (r6), respectively, expressed as percentage changes. The reference years are
2006 (before the crisis) and 2011 (after the crisis). It is worth noting that there are some
missing data of regulatory responses, especially for the first index measuring the response
through capital requirement (i5 is only calculated for 10 EU member states, cf. Table 3).
There are no data of Italy’s peak of nonperforming loans (c1), and there are no data for
Sweden in all three regulatory responses. What is more, indicators starting with a 0 on an
ordinal scale have been rescaled by one unit to avoid undefined expression (by dividing by
0).
A cursory look at the data shows some interesting patterns as regards the intensity of
reactions. Unlike the macroeconomic responses, where few countries had shown under-
reaction, the regulatory responses show a greater variation in the tendency for governments
to move toward either lenient or stringent measures. Quite surprisingly, this had occurred
within a sample of countries that are extremely well coordinated within the European
Union and the single financial market and many of them are part of the Eurozone.
Cross-country comparison indicates a distinction between governments that underre-
acted, such as Portugal and Slovenia, and those that tended to overact, such as Greece and
Ireland. The latter are also overreacted on the macroeconomic response. Other countries
with overreaction on the macroeconomics, such as Belgium and Denmark, have no clear
and coherent tendency in their regulatory responses. Belgium had more stringent capital
requirements, but also less stringent control over liquidity and risk diversification and
banking surveillance, whereas Denmark has increased banking surveillance. Overall, with
the exception of Belgium, the countries that greatly overreacted in their macroeconomic
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policy response had more stringent surveillance mechanisms. It is also important to note
that Denmark and Ireland had a more relaxed approach to measures that are directly linked
to risk in the banking sector. For both countries, there was a tendency to underreact in an
aspect of regulatory reform where many other countries went in the opposite direction.
This is also evidenced by specific survey items that indicated the exceptionality of Den-
mark and Ireland in their regulatory control over banks. As of the end of 2010, Denmark
was the only country in the sample that had no bank ownership level thresholds that would
trigger evaluation and approval requirements by the banking supervisory authority. In a
similar vein, as of the end of 2010, Ireland was the only country in the sample that did not
require the sources of funds to be used as capital to be verified by the regulatory/super-
visory authorities.
We can also observe a variation in the type of reactions. Changes in the three types of
instruments analyzed here are about equally frequent, although measures of deregulation
related to liquidity and risk diversification tend to be underregulated with a frequency of
negative values that is double that the overreaction responses. However, they come in
different combinations: i6 and i7 are quite frequently combined, while i5 is usually acti-
vated alone or even follows an opposite dynamic from the other two.
The comparison between the magnitudes of reactions is also interesting (Fig. 1). Most
countries tend to react extremely, but in a specific way. Other ones display more stability,
such as Austria, France, Latvia, and the Netherlands. One could argue that institutional
conditions, such as veto players, may help in explaining this difference.
Systematizing the indexes of policy responses
After illustrating the empirical findings associated with the proposed indexes of dispro-
portionate responses to the banking crisis, we attempt to systematize this set of indexes
according to a number of key conceptual dimensions and taxonomies of responses. Table 5
summarizes different dimensions of disproportionate policy reaction.
We classify policy responses according to three dimensions: risk, institutions and the
overall extent of regulatory and macroeconomic response. The first dimension revolves
-2
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-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
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2.5
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Fig. 1 The magnitude of disproportionality in regulatory (and surveillance) responses
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around the extent of banking regulation change that is directly related to systemic banking
risk. Here the emphasis is on the policy components that aim to reduce systemic banking
risk: capital requirements (i5) and liquidity and risk diversification (i6). With few partial
exceptions (Portugal and Luxembourg, which adopted less stringent regulation on both
components), Table 3 shows that usually governments have the preference to compensate
their overreaction in one policy component with underreaction in the other policy com-
ponent. No country has pursued a stringent approach on both measures for reducing the
systemic banking risk.
The second dimension of policy response is related to the level of institutionalization of
the banking surveillance system. Designing and utilizing new regulatory institutions may
imply a certain level of policy overreaction. Relying on index i7, we can identify two
countries that had an extreme response: Spain reduced its institutional surveillance, while
Ireland and Luxembourg enormously strengthened their institutional surveillance. We are
aware that this dimension of policy change would require a careful qualitative analysis of
the institutional innovations adopted in the sample of countries. Accordingly, additional
qualitative research is needed to assess and verify the extent of institutional innovation in
Ireland and Luxembourg, as well as the policy mix in Spain, composed of a stringent
Table 5 Synthesis of three dimensions of policy responses
Dimensions of
(dis)proportionate
policy response
Indexes Overreaction Normal action Underreaction
Systemic risk i5 and
i6
Measures of stringent
regulation in both
capital requirement
and liquidity and risk
diversification
Compensation of
stringent and lenient
regulatory changes in
both capital
requirements and
liquidity and risk
diversification
Measures of lenient
regulation in both
capital
requirements and
liquidity and risk
diversification
No country All the countries with
the exclusion of
Luxembourg and
Portugal
Luxembourg and
Portugal
Level of
institutionalization
for banking
surveillance
i7 Enhancement of the
surveillance through
institutional
innovations
Strengthening the
previous surveillance
institutions and
mechanisms
No change or
institutional
deregulation
Ireland and
Luxembourg
Spain
Extent of change
(macroeconomics
and banking
regulation
components)
i1–i7 Large regulatory
reform enacting
stringent control over
banking sector
associated with large
macroeconomic
interventions
A calibrated mix of
policy under- and
overreaction to the
banking crisis
Deregulation plus
macroeconomic
responses through
fiscal measures
No country Typical examples:
Germany and the
Netherlands
Portugal and
Slovenia
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requirement for liquidity and risk diversification and lenient banking surveillance
(Tables 3, 5).
The final dimension of policy response attempts to qualitatively capture the overall
reaction of a government to the banking crisis. Although this classification of the level of
regulatory action can be considered a crude assessment of reform, it allows us to identify
those few countries that tried to deal with the banking crisis exclusively through
macroeconomic policy responses (Portugal and Slovenia). It also allows us to identify the
few cases of a carefully calibrated mix of macroeconomic and banking regulation changes,
for example Germany and the Netherlands. We were not able to find any examples of the
ideal type of extreme reaction: no countries pursued a policy response that could be
characterized as macroeconomic overreaction and banking regulation overreaction.
Overall, this classification of typologies of disproportionate policy response allows us to
have a nuanced discussion of changes and responses in policy domains that are populated
by a mix of strategies and tools for controlling markets and reducing their associated risks,
in this case of the banking sector. These classifications can guide the identification of case
studies that deserve an in-depth analysis, such as Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain.
Conclusion
The goals of our piece of research are twofold. To begin with, we wanted to make a
methodological contribution to the literature on disproportionate policy responses by
developing a procedure to operationalize policy under- and overreactions that is suit-
able for comparative research. We did so by proposing a measure of (dis)proportionality
that relates to both the average response of a sample of countries and to domestic-level
variation in the severity of the crisis.
Moreover, we illustrated this procedure and its implications with an empirical study of
policy responses to the 2007–2008 banking crisis. The proposed indexes capture the extent
of the macroeconomic (fiscal) response and the regulatory and surveillance response. This
approach has allowed us to identify some general patterns that would have not been
possible to detect through a qualitative and small-n analysis:
1. The vast majority of the EU member states in our samples of macroeconomic fiscal
responses to the 2007–2008 banking crisis overreacted in policy terms, through the
government guarantee of banking deposits and bailout;
2. The regulatory and surveillance component of government response (captured by our
sample of 15 EU member states) was more varied. Most countries combined a mix of
stringent and lenient measures.
3. Stringent regulatory measures of liquidity and risk diversification requirements were a
common but not a general pattern.
4. Only Portugal and Slovenia faced the banking crisis through a combination of
macroeconomic measures and deregulation. No countries implemented both extreme
macroeconomic policy and very stringent banking regulation and surveillance.
5. Among the countries that chose to overreact through macroeconomic measures, there
was no common pattern of regulatory reform.
The proposed procedure is not specific to banking regulation and can be extended to other
policy areas that are characterized by well-defined policy reactions in the form of policy
outputs (e.g., decisions and regulations) to crisis events whose severity can be quantified
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and displays a certain variation across entities. For instance, promising areas of research
would be food safety or the regulation of therapeutic products. More generally, further
comparative policy analyses should look at three specific dimensions that this paper has
overlooked. First, the extent of international coordination of policy responses needs to be
carefully qualified. Second, in-depth qualitative analyses of the mix of policy responses
should test the effectiveness of the proposed indexes by focusing on the most extreme
cases of policy over- and underreaction. Third, it would be interesting to examine varia-
tions in patterns of disproportionality not only cross-country but also cross-sector.
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